Abstract This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
and Herzegovina as an independent entity within the Dayton Accords that put an end to a 3-year civil war over the spoils of the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
There are several situations where the solution of a fair division problem cannot call on instruments like prices, monetary compensations, or auctions. This may be due to liquidity constraints; or to the psychological difficulty of bringing a dispute down to monetary evaluations; or to political constraints, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or to the presence of judicially enforceable rights-such as under U.S. law-"to seek partition in kind, or physical division, of jointly owned land"; see Miceli and Sirmans (2000) .
This paper studies the problem of fair division when the dispute must be resolved using division in kind. We are interested in devising a procedure that can help the parties to reach an outcome that is both fair and efficient. We assume that the disputed object is a single infinitely divisible good over which agents have heterogeneous preferences and that there are no consumption externalities. The canonical example is the division of a cake, when agents have different (additive) preferences over different slices; see Steinhaus (1948) . A less obvious example is the case of a finite (or countable) number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods, where the aggregate endowment is viewed as the single heterogeneous good at stake; see Chambers (2005, Sect. 5).
There are two main ordinal concepts in the fair division literature. The first is the envy-free principle which states that each party should (weakly) prefers its share to anyone else's. This was proposed by Gamow and Stern (1958, pp. 117-119) , but became widely known after Foley (1967) . Any efficient envy-free allocation is ex post stable because no one desires to exchange what he received with anyone else's share. However, this solution concept suffers from a multiplicity problem that makes it less satisfactory from an ex-ante, or procedural, point of view. There are in general many efficient envy-free allocations, and each of them provides different payoffs to the agents. Therefore, they are likely to disagree on how to select one among these allocations. The divide-and-choose mechanism under complete information, for instance, selects among all the efficient envy-free allocations the division that maximizes the payoff to the divider-so conflict is likely to shift over how the divider is chosen.
An alternative normative concept is the egalitarian equivalent criterion which states that each party should be indifferent between getting his share and some reference bundle, identical for all agents. This was introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) to overcome the problem that efficient no-envy allocation may not exist at all for economies with nonconvex preferences or with production. As different reference bundles lead to different shares, the multiplicity problem over efficient and egalitarian equivalent allocations resurfaces in the choice of the reference bundle. Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) suggests circumventing the difficulty by focusing only on those reference bundles that are proportional to the total endowment. (Assuming efficiency, this leads to a unique selection.) Sprumont and Zhou (1999) axiomatizes this "Pazner-Schmeidler" rule for large exchange economies with convex preferences where the endowment is a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods.
It is not immediately obvious how to extend the "Pazner-Schmeidler" rule when the endowment is a single heterogeneous good. Consider the division of a contested cake among a group of people who have equal claims on it. The agents may evaluate the value of a piece of the cake along different attributes: its crust, its filling, its weight,
